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Abstract 
An appreciation of object-centred spatial relations involves representing a ‘within-object’ spatial 
relation across changes in the object orientation. This representational ability is important in 
adult object recognition [Biederman, I. (1987). Recognition-bycomponents: A theory of human 
image understanding. Psychological Review, 94, 115–147; Marr, D., & Nishihara, H. K. 
(1978). Representation and recognition of the spatial organisation of three-dimensional structure. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B (Biological Sciences), 200, 269–294; Tarr, 
M. J., & Pinker, S. (1990). When does human object recognition use a viewer-centred reference 
frame? Psychological Science, 1, 253–256] and is also thought to be a fundamental component 
of the mature object concept [Piaget, J. (1954). The Construction of Reality in the Child. 
Routledge & Kegan-Paul: London, UK. (Originally published in French in 1937)]. An experiment 
is reported in which eighteen 4-month-old infants were familiarised to a specific spatial relation 
within an object, across six different orientations of the object. On subsequent test trials the 
object was presented to the infants in an entirely novel orientation. Between successive test trials 
the within-object spatial relation was alternated between novel and familiar. The infants 
demonstrated significant sensitivity of their looking to both the novelty of the stimuli and the 
order in which novel and familiar stimuli were presented. It is concluded that by 4 months of age 
infants are able to form object-centred spatial frames of reference. These findings are discussed in 
the light of our current understanding of the development of object representation during infancy. 
 
Keywords: Object concept; Spatial representation; Infancy; Cognitive development; Object 
recognition 
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The nature of our internal representations of ‘object-centred’ spatial coordinates is a topic of 
controversy and continued debate (Biederman, 1987; Mozer, 2002; Tarr, Williams, Hayward, & 
Gautier, 1998; Tipper & Behrmann, 1996; Vecera, Behrmann, & Filapek, 2001). One view is that 
objects are encoded and stored relative to egocentric spatial coordinates (Tarr, 1999), and that the 
information in such egocentric representations is rich enough to provide reliable object 
recognition across a variety of changes in orientation relative to the observer (Mozer, 2002). On 
the other hand, following Marr and Nishihara (1978); Biederman (1987) has argued that certain 
‘3D volumes’ can be described by the visual system in a view-invariant code. Support for these 
‘structural description’ theories has come from neuropsychological evidence of specific 
impairments in object-centred spatial representation (Tipper & Behrmann, 1996). Despite strong 
objections to a pure view-invariant code for object recognition (Tarr, 1999; Tarr and 
Bulthoff, 1998) there is still clear agreement that at least some degree of object-centred spatial 
representation must exist (Mozer, 2002; Tarr and Pinker, 1990). Indeed, some have suggested 
that the mature visual system uses both view-specific and view-invariant representations of 
objects (Hummel, 2000).  
 
It seems likely that theway in which object representation skills develop in infancy and childhood 
will have important implications for how object recognition is achieved in adulthood. So it is 
surprising that little developmental research has been done on object recognition. Nonetheless, it 
has been considered. Piaget (1937/1954) provides some striking examples of situations in which 
infants appear to be unable to use object-centred spatial reference. Here he describes how 
Laurent, at 7 months, has difficulty with his bottle at feeding time: 
 
Obs. 78. At 0;7 (4) I present the bottle in a vertical position to Laurent . . . he looks at it from 
bottom to top, sees the nipple and immediately brings it towards his mouth. He sucks. I take it 
from his hands and present it to him horizontally; Laurent easily turns the bottle in a quarter 
circle and puts the nipple in his mouth . . . I present the bottle upside down, Laurent seeing 
only the bottom and no longer perceiving the nipple; he looks at it for one or two seconds, 
begins to howl without making any attempt at reversal . . . Laurent looks, begins to suck the 
glass (the bottom), and howls again (Piaget, 1937/1954, p.127). 
 
Piaget’s point here is that Laurent cannot understand that the manual rotations of which he is 
capable will allow him to search for the reverse side of an object. Although Laurent can obviously 
recognise the bottle in all orientations (his frustration at not being able to feed himself, and the 
ineffectual attempts he makes to achieve this are indicators of his recognition), it is clear that the 
schema through which he recognises it does not also serve him as a detailed enough spatial 
representation for action. The impression that is taken from this example is that infants, even 
after 7 months of age, form relatively primitive representations of objects, to the extent where 
they do not represent their constant spatial shape.  
 
From Piaget’s (1936/1952, 1937/1954) developmental perspective, a view-independent structural 
representation of objects is an essential part of attaining a conception of objects as being constant 
entities that are independent of the self. Piaget argued that initially young infants are severely 
limited in this respect by their dependence on egocentric spatial reference, and that the 
development of more complex schemas for action in the external environment prompts them 
to construct representations of coordinates relative to external spatial frameworks. Research 
directed at determining the spatial frames of reference available in infancy (utilising visual 
anticipation and manual search measures) seems to support this position. Acredolo (1978); 
Bertenthal, Campos, and Barrett (1984); Bremner (1978); Bremner and Bryant (1977); Bremner 
and Bryant (2001); Butterworth, Jarrett, and Hicks (1982); Gilmore and Johnson (1997a, 
1997b) have all presented evidence indicating that infants progress from the use of primitive 
retinocentric or egocentric spatial reference to more external frames of reference as they get older, 
or receive more locomotor experience.1 This supports Piaget’s assertion that infants’ early 
representations of objects are largely egocentric.  
                                                             
1 Though see Hermer & Spelke, 1994, Newcombe (2003), Newcombe and Huttenlocher, 2000 for alternative opinions on 
the development of spatial representation in infancy. 
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On the other hand, subsequent research into infants’ representations of objects (mostly utilising 
looking time measures) produced results that suggest a quite different conclusion. The fixed-trial 
familiarisation technique (Slater, 1995) has been particularly illuminating concerning infants’ 
ability to represent the constant stimulus properties of objects across changes in the proximal 
stimulation that they offer. In this procedure infants are familiarised to several (often six) variants 
in the proximal stimulation offered by an object of a fixed distal size or shape, and are then 
tested for a preference between two objects, of novel and familiar distal sizes or shapes. Using this 
technique, Slater and colleagues have shown that newborns can discriminate between objects on 
the basis of their real shape (the shape of an object that remains constant despite changes in an 
object’s slant in relation to the observer’s retina) (Slater & Morison, 1985) and size (Slater, 
Mattock, & Brown, 1990).  
 
It also turns out that infants’ early representations of spatial relations may not be as 
egocentrically biased as Piaget suggested. Using looking behaviour in a habituation-novelty 
design, Kaufman and Needham (1999) tested whether young infants could represent 
environmental spatial layout independently of egocentric coordinates. They habituated a group of 
6.5-month-olds to an object placed at a particular location on a table. Each habituation trial 
consisted of the infant being moved into one particular location relative to the table and the 
object. Following habituation, the infants were either moved into view at the opposite side of the 
table, or they were moved back to the side from which they had already observed the scene during 
habituation. In both these test conditions the object was then presented in either a novel location 
relative to the table (new egocentric location), or a familiar location with respect to the table (old 
egocentric location). The 6-month-olds continued to habituate if the object stayed in the same 
allocentric location whether or not they had been moved around the table. However, no matter 
where the infants were positioned, when the object moved to a new allocentric location they 
dishabituated significantly. Kaufman and Needham (1999) concluded that 6.5-month-old infants 
are able to code allocentric spatial location.  
 
Evidence that infants of this young age are able to encode aspects of their visual environment 
independently of the egocentric spatial array does not answer the question whether they are also 
able to code the constant spatial layout of an object across changes in its orientation, despite 
Piaget’s observation related above. However, the spatial representation of objects, can be 
considered a separate and even more complicated problem than spatial representation of the 
environment. Objects, and especially manipulable objects, as well as moving in depth frequently 
change in their orientation relative to the observer and environment. As such, they do not retain a 
fixed spatial relation to either egocentric or environmental frames of reference.  
 
Thus, in order to represent the spatial relations within objects, infants need to utilise a spatial 
frame of reference that is independent of retinocentric, egocentric (body-centred), and allocentric 
(environmental) coordinates. The current experiment set out to determine whether young (4-
month-old) infants can represent the spatial information in a within-object (object-centred) 
frame of reference.We used the fixed-trial familiarisation method to determine whether infants 
can perceive and encode the spatial location of a feature within an object’s frame of reference. 
Following familiarisation to a single object-centred location (OCL), we tested discrimination by 
examining whether infants show a post-familiarisation preference for a novel over a familiar 
object-centred location. In order to determine whether infants can represent object-centred 
location independently of egocentric and allocentric reference frames, we tested this 
discrimination of object-centred locations across changes in the object’s orientation relative to 
egocentric and allocentric frameworks. 
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1. Method 
1.1. Stimuli 
A schematic diagram of the object that we used to present object-centred locations is shown in 
four orientations in Fig. 1. It was shaped in the form of a capital ‘T’, and thus comprised three 
limbs; one perpendicularly oriented in relation to the other two. All three limbs of the object were 
the same appearance as each other (apart from their spatial relation to the other limbs) and the 
same length from the point of intersection. Each limb also contained a marked location that was 
occupied by a light that could be switched on or off. These object-centred locations are labelled 
in Fig. 1 as OCLs 1–3. When illuminated these OCLs were identical in appearance, making it 
possible for us to manipulate the spatial relation of a feature (light) to the object framework, 
simply by changing the OCL that was illuminated. We could change the object’s orientation by 
rotating it within the picture plane around the point of rotation (located at the intersection of the 
two main axes). By rotating the object we were able to present any one object-centred location in 
several different egocentric/allocentric locations. As each of the OCLs was equidistant from the 
point of rotation, each also had the capacity to occupy the same distribution of locations in 
egocentric/allocentric space, and thus we could equate them on this basis. 
1.2. Design 
In order to avoid confounding object-centred with egocentric/allocentric frameworks, we 
familiarised infants to a single object-centred location presented in six different orientations of 
the object. The variation of the object’s orientation across the familiarisation phase is a measure 
taken to desensitise the infants to the object’s relation to egocentric spatial coordinates.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Starting and test trial orientations of the T-shape, with object-centred locations (OCLs) labelled in 
orientation ‘1’. 
 
Fig. 2. A schematic example of one experimental session (starting orientation 2, Order group 1, OCL comparison 1, 
and Novel OCL 2/3 (in this case ‘1’)). 
The familiarisation phase comprised six trials. The object was presented in a different orientation 
on each of these trials. For all participants the object underwent a fixed order of rotations between 
trials: Trials 1–2: 225. anticlockwise, trials 2–3: 180. clockwise, trials 3–4: 135. clockwise, trials 
4–5: 180. anticlockwise, trials 5–6: 135. clockwise, trials 6-test: 225. anticlockwise. For each 
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infant, the object started in one of four ‘starting orientations’ (see Fig. 1), and thus the orientation 
of the object on each trial depended on the starting orientation of the object.  
 
On each familiarisation trial the same object-centred spatial location was lit up. Thus, the object-
centred location shown to each participant was invariant across all familiarisation trials. An 
example of familiarisation phase is shown in Fig. 2. In this example the familiarised object-
centred location is OCL 2, and the starting orientation of the object is ‘2’. 
 
After familiarisation, the test phase presented novel and familiar OCLs within the T-object on 
successive trials. During the test phase we only drew novel-familiar contrasts between OCL 1 and 
OCL 2, or OCL 1 and OCL 3 (see Fig. 1). For successful discrimination, these particular contrasts 
require the representation of a spatial relation to only a single dimension or axis of the object. The 
object-centred contrast between OCLs 2 and 3 is only differentiated with respect to a coordinated 
representation of two of the object’s axes. Tarr and Pinker (1990) have shown that adults 
recognise these more complex configural relations by using mental rotation to match against a 
stored egocentric representation. As we were testing object-centred spatial representation rather 
than egocentric spatial representation (with mental rotation) we excluded the 2D contrast from 
the current design.2 
 
In order to be sure that a preference for the novel OCL could not be due to the novelty of the light 
in relation to the object in one particular orientation, we presented the object in a completely 
novel orientation in the test phase. We also wanted to be sure that a preference for the novel OCL 
could not be due to a novelty preference for the location of the light in relation to egocentric 
coordinates. Thus, at test we presented the object in such an orientation as to place the novel OCL 
in an egocentrically defined location that had already been occupied by the light during one of 
the familiarisation trials. The sequence of object orientations on familiarisation and test trials (see 
above) was arranged such that the familiar OCL was presented in an egocentric location that had 
not been occupied by the OCL light on any familiarisation trial. 
 
The test phase also comprised six trials. For each participant the object was presented in the same 
orientation from trial to trial. We rotated the object through 360. between each test trial. The 
directions of these rotations between each test trial were again in a fixed order for each 
participant: anticlockwise, anticlockwise, clockwise, clockwise, and anticlockwise. 
 
The test phase was divided into three blocks of paired trials. In each block a novel object-centred 
location was highlighted on one trial, and the familiarised object-centred location (the OCL which 
a participant saw highlighted on all six familiarisation trials) on the other. Two order groups were 
presented with either the novel trial first within each block (order group 1), or the familiar trial 
first with each block (order group 2). Order group 1 was presented with the novel OCL on test 
trials 1, 3 and 5, and order group 2 with the novel OCL on test trials 2, 4 and 6.  
 
Each participant saw the same novel OCL highlighted across all of the three novel trials. Half the 
infants was given a comparison between OCLs 1 and 2 (OCL comparison 1), and the other half 
between OCLs 1 and 3 (OCL comparison 2). This variable was called ‘OCL Comparison’. The OCL 
which was assigned as the novel OCL in a given OCL comparison was also varied. Thus, infants 
were either familiarised to OCL 1, or OCLs 2/3, and were respectively assigned OCLs 2/3, or OCL 
1 as the novel OCL. This variable was called ‘Novel OCL’.  
 
The orders of the novel and familiar trials (x2), the OCL Comparison (x2), and Novel OCL 
Comparison (x2) were all counterbalanced across participants. The starting orientation (1–4) of 
the object was assigned to infants by a random allocation, with the restriction that there was an 
equal number of each of the starting orientations across the sample, and also within each order 
group. 
                                                             
2 The issue of mental rotation in infancy is addressed by Rochat and Hespos (1996) and Hespos and Rochat 
(1997). While their experiment also uses a ‘T-shaped’ stimulus they were not investigating spatial coding of a 
feature to an object-centred frame of reference, which is the question of interest here. 
Object-centrered spatial reference.                                                                  Goldsmiths Research Online 
 
6
6
1.3. Participants 
Eighteen infants took part, of which 13 were female, and five male. Their mean age was 124 days 
(S.D. = 4.9). A further nine babies were tested but their data were excluded as five reached ceiling 
looking times on all test trials3, and four fussed too much for us to complete the test. Nine infants 
were tested in each order group. The mean age of the infants (7 female and 2 male) in order group 
1 (novel OCL trial presented first) was 123 days (S.D. = 4.5). The mean age of the infants (6 female 
and 3 male) in order group 2 (novel OCL trial presented second) was 125 (S.D. = 5.4). The infants 
who participated in this experiment lived were primarily from middle-class European-American 
families, and were selected on the basis of their parents volunteering to take part in the research 
programme. 
1.4. Apparatus 
All three limbs of the T-shaped object were 12.5 cm long from the point of intersection, 4 cm in 
width, and 4 cm in depth. Each OCL consisted of five green light emitting diodes (LEDs), fixed 
inside the T-shape and concealed (when not illuminated) behind a square window made from 
diffuse perspex. The object was mounted on a pole extending back in depth from the point of 
rotation. This pole was also mounted on a flat surface, so that the object’s long axis moved within 
the frontal plane of an upright infant observer when it rotated. Everything behind the T-shape, 
including the pole, was concealed behind a black screen.  
 
Behind the concealing screen the experimenter was able to change the orientation of the object 
unseen by rotating the pole. The experimenter was also able to observe the infant participants’ 
visual aspect by way of a video camera mounted in the screen, about a foot above the object. Each 
infant viewed the object whilst sitting in an upright position on one of their parents’ laps so that 
their eyes were roughly 60 cm from the stimulus. The seating position placed the infants with the 
object at their midlines. The longest axis of the T-shape presented roughly 22.6. of visual angle to 
the infant participants. Thus, if the infant were fixating the point of rotation, the end of each of 
the limbs extended roughly 11.3. into the periphery.  
 
The lights in the T-shape were controlled automatically from a PC that also served as a 
millisecond timer for the infants’ visual fixations. As the procedure involved infant-controlled 
familiarisation (i.e. familiarisation trials last until the infant has regarded the object for a fixed 
amount of time), we designed a programme which illuminated the stimulus lights and 
extinguished them automatically once the millisecond timer had registered a fixed amount of 
looking time. 
1.5. Procedure 
We thought it important to provide the infants with the same amount of exposure to each 
stimulus variant. Otherwise we might have run the risk of weighting their representations of 
object-centred location unevenly on one or two orientations of the object, and might consequently 
have overemphasised the inappropriate egocentric and allocentric frames of reference. Under 
some circumstances, the duration for which infants look at variants of stimuli has been found to 
decline over the familiarisation period (Bomba & Siqueland, 1983; Quinn, Eimas, & Tarr, 2002). 
Thus, in order to present the infants with equal exposure to the six variants, each trial was 
presented for a fixed amount of accumulated looking. This fixed-trial familiarisation procedure 
has been used in a similar form with newborns by Slater, Mattock, Brown, and Bremner (1991), 
and with newborns and 3-month-olds by Quinn, Slater, Brown, and Hayes (2001). Both groups 
found that six variants were sufficient to elicit a test trial novelty preference.  
 
Before testing began, we asked the parent to try to keep the infant in a constant upright posture, 
and not to direct the child’s attention during the procedure. We also asked them not to watch the 
stimulus presentation themselves, but instead to observe their child.  
                                                             
3  Infants who looked at the object for a total 80 s or more, out of a possible 90 s across the test phase were excluded. 
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The experimental session began once parent and child were comfortably seated, and the child was 
settled. A curtain was lifted to reveal the object, and the first familiarisation trial began once the 
infant had fixated the object. The onset of each trial was signified by a short tone from the 
computer. Each familiarisation trial began with a single location lighting up (the familiarised 
OCL). When the infant had looked at the T-shape object (the whole object, not just the light) for 
10 s (recorded by the experimenter with the millisecond timer linked to the control computer), the 
light was automatically turned off. This was also signalled by another short tone from the 
computer. The experimenter then rotated the T-shape to a new orientation (the rotation of the 
object was fully visible to the infant), and the next familiarisation trial would then begin (inter-
trial interval was set to 4 s). For each infant, the light event appeared in the same object-centred 
location on every familiarisation trial.  
 
Following six familiarisation trials, we presented the infants with six test trials. As in 
familiarisation the onset of each trial was signified by a tone from the computer, and the 
illumination of one OCL. However, unlike the familiarisation trials, each test trial lasted for 15 s of 
real time, during which the amount of time the infants spent looking at the whole object (not just 
the light) was recorded using the millisecond timer. The accuracy of test trial timings was later 
verified by referring to video recordings of the test trials.  
 
When verifying infants’ looking times from video recordings, the experimenter and the reliability 
observer were both blind to the familiarity/novelty of the test trials. Inter-observer reliabilitywas 
obtained by comparing the experimenter’s and a reliability observer’s total familiar and novel 
test-trial timings taken from the video records of 16 of the 18 infant test sessions.4 Inter-observer 
reliability ratings for novel and familiar test trials ranged between Pearson’s r = 0.93 
and Pearson’s r = 0.97. 
2. Results 
Due to our fixed-trial accumulated looking procedure, all infants looked at the object for 10 s 
during each familiarisation trial. Thus, each looked at the object + light event for a total of 60 s 
during the familiarisation phase.  
 
We calculated preference scores for each infant on each test trial block, by subtracting the amount 
of object-directed looking they demonstrated on the familiar trial from that they showed on the 
novel trial. Fig. 3 shows the infants’ mean preference scores within each order group and test trial 
block. There is a positive preference score in 5 of the 6 test cells. However, the preference also 
appears to be dependent upon the order in which familiar and novel trials occur within each 
block. Infants in order group 1 demonstrate a consistent preference for the novel trial across all 
test blocks, whereas the infants in order group 2 appear to show a reduced or no novelty 
preference.  
 
Because stimuli presented in the first test trials can affect novelty preferences in the later test trial 
blocks, we carried out an initial analysis of the looking times on only the values within the first 
block. These were entered into an ANOVA with ‘order’ as a between-subjects factor. Order did not 
reach significance (F(1,16) = 4.0, p > 0.06). A two-tailed one-sample t-test revealed that the 
preference score was significantly greater than 0 on this trial (t(17) = 2.4, p = 0.03).  
 
Thus, on the first block, infants show a consistent novelty preference, indicating an ability to 
discriminate between familiar and novel object-centred spatial locations. The 18 infants who 
completed the test session presented data for a total of 54 novel-familiar test trial blocks.  
                                                             
4  The video records of two of the infants’ test trial looking behaviour were lost before reliability was computed. However, 
as inter-observer reliability was high, we included the first observer’s scores for these two infants in the analysis. 
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Fig. 3. Novelty preference (difference scores) across blocks 1–3, and between order groups. 
The infants demonstrated a novelty preference within these test trial blocks on 37 of the 54 trials. 
According to a binomial test this proportion of novelty preference is significantly greater than 
would have been expected by chance (p < 0.01). This coarse analysis corroborates the novelty 
preference found in the first trial block.  
 
Next, we undertook a full statistical analysis of the mean difference between infants’ looking at 
the novel and familiar OCL configurations across order groups and all test trial blocks. A 
preliminary ANOVA revealed no significant effects or interactions of OCL comparison, novel OCL, 
or the starting orientation of the object. The data were thus collapsed across these variables for 
analysis. A mixed design ANOVA of one within-subjects factor (test trial block (1–3)), and one 
between-subjects factor (order group (1 or 2)) was carried out on the infants’ mean preference 
scores (looking on novel trial – looking on familiar trial) (see Fig. 3). This analysis uncovered a 
main effect of order group (F(1,16) = 7.2, p < 0.017). An effect of test block did not reach 
significance (F(2,32) = 2.8, p = 0.076). There was no significant interaction between order group 
and test trial block (F(2,32) = 1.6, n.s).  
 
Closer inspection of the data, however, indicates a heterogeneity of variance between subgroups. 
The more extreme looking preferences (to novel and familiar stimuli) demonstrate higher 
variance between subjects. This heterogeneity is observable in Fig. 3, where the more extreme 
preference means show greater variance. Due to this violation of parametric assumptions, and 
particularly the borderline nature of the main effect of block we decided to conduct a second 
analysis of the main effects using non-parametric tests.  
 
A Mann–Whitney test of the effect of order group on the difference score across all test trial 
blocks confirmed the main order effect shown in the ANOVA (U= 15, Z = 2.3, p < 0.025). A 
Friedman test for difference in preference scores between test trial blocks (collapsed across both 
order groups) demonstrated a significant effect of test trial block (xf = 10.1, N= 18, p = 0.006). 
Post hoc Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests showed that this effect was largely due to the difference in 
preference between blocks 2 and 3 (Z = 2.8, N= 18, g = 0.005). The differences between 
preference scores in test blocks 1 and 2 (Z = 1.2, N= 18, n.s.), and 1 and 3 (Z = 0.9, N= 18, n.s.) 
were not significant.  
 
One-sample t-tests of the novelty preference within each block, showed that, across both order 
groups, the infants demonstrated significant novelty preferences in test trial blocks 1 (t(17) = 2.4, 
p = 0.03) and 3 (t(17) = 2.7, p = 0.02), but no preference in block 2 (t(17) = 0.3, n.s). The 
significant novelty preferences shown here indicate that 4-month-olds are able to discriminate 
between objects on the basis of their constant spatial configuration, despite changes in object 
orientation within the picture plane. Furthermore the modulation of these novelty effects by order 
indicate that the infants’ patterns of looking were sensitive to the temporal relationship between 
Object-centrered spatial reference.                                                                  Goldsmiths Research Online 
 
9
9
novel and familiar test stimuli (Scöhner & Thelen, in press). Both findings indicate that the 
infants were able to form a basic object-centred spatial representation. 
3. Discussion 
Following familiarisation to a single object-centred location presented in six different orientations 
of the object, the infants tested here demonstrated a preference for a novel object-centred spatial 
configuration over the a familiar one, despite both configurations being presented in novel 
orientations with respect to the infants’ egocentric axes. This result indicates that 4-month-olds 
are able to notice changes in feature location relative to an object, independently of egocentric 
and allocentric frames of reference. This novelty preference was significant within the first test 
trial comparison block, and over all three blocks of test comparisons. Between test trial blocks the 
infants’ preference for novel and familiar were modulated by the order in which the novel and 
familiar OCLs were presented, indicating that the infants were also sensitive to the temporal 
relationship between novel and familiar test stimuli. We can conclude that, under these 
conditions, 4-month-olds can discriminate and remember object-centred spatial coordinates.  
 
We offer two explanations of the effect of order on the novelty preference scores. Firstly, the 
latency of novel test trials, in relation to familiar in order group 2 means that a novelty preference 
will be working against any effects of fatigue that accumulate towards the end of the test phase. 
Secondly, order of presentation is frequently found to have an effect on novelty preferences 
(Baillargeon, 1987; Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Johnson et al., 2003; 
Rivera, Wakeley, & Langer, 1999), in which ‘novel first’ groups show greater novelty preferences 
than familiar first groups (as was found here). Sch¨oner and Thelen (in press) have presented a 
‘dynamic field theory’ of infant habituation in which such order effects are explained by the 
competition between the inhibitory action of habituation and activation due to the novelty of the 
test phase itself. Once the test phase had begun in the current experiment, the object no longer 
changed orientation from trial to trial. It is possible that the novelty activation of the test phase 
encountered before the first novel stimulus in order group 2 produced enough activation of 
attention to overrun the effect of habituation to the familiar stimulus. In support of this 
interpretation, we note that the infants showed their largest overall novelty preference in test 
trial block 3, where the activation produced by the onset of the test trial phase would be predicted 
to have the weakest effect.  
 
The ability of 4-month-old infants to represent object-centred spatial relations is informative in 
several ways. Firstly, our results have implications concerning young infants’ ability to use 
external spatial frames of reference. Kaufman and Needham (1999) showed that 6.5-month-olds 
are able to use allocentric (or environmental) spatial frames of reference, independently of 
variation relative to the egocentric field. Our results extend the findings of Kaufman 
and Needham (1999) by showing that 4-month-olds also have the ability to form spatial 
representations that are independent of both egocentric and environmental spatial frames of 
reference. This kind of spatial representation is an essential component of object-centred spatial 
representation, as objects vary not only with respect to the body but also relative to the 
environmental framework.  
 
With regard to adult models of visual object recognition our findings suggest that view-invariant 
representations of objects are available early in development. The infants we tested were able to 
generalise a familiar object-centred spatial configuration to a completely new stationary 
orientation of the object. The particular spatial discrimination that the infants used to make this 
generalization required a simple one-dimensional reference with respect to the object-centred 
spatial framework. This complexity of representation is ascribed to adults in both view-
dependent and view-independent theories of object recognition (Biederman, 1987; Tarr & Pinker, 
1990). Beyond this level of representational complexity, view-dependent theories suggest that 
objects are recognised by mentally rotation to match against stored egocentric spatial 
representations of the object. This early ability to represent object-centred spatial frameworks is 
at odds with Piaget’s constructionist account of the development of spatial representation. Piaget 
proposed that infants’ spatial representations were initially restricted to egocentric coordinates, 
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with more independent spatial reference arising from infants’ active exploration of 
their environment. At 4 months, infants have a fairly limited repertoire of object-directed manual 
actions (Hofsten & Fazel- Zandy, 1984; Hofsten & R¨onnqvist, 1988), and thus it seems unlikely 
this early ability is developmentally dependent upon construction through manual schemas. In 
line with the conclusion suggested by a great deal of infancy research over the last 20 years (cf. 
Baillargeon, 2002; Harris & Butterworth, 2002; Slater, 1995), active manual exploration does not 
appear to be a vital prerequisite for learning about objects. 
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